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The Place of Communism
in Chinese History:
Reflections on the Past and Future
of the People’s Republic of China
Maurice Meisner

I. Introduction

C

ritics of Mao Zedong often compared the late Chairman to Qin
Shihuangdi, the First Emperor who in the year 221 B.C. united the various feudal kingdoms of ancient China into a centralized empire under
the Qin dynasty, the first in a long 2000-year line of imperial regimes.
In traditional Confucian historiography, the First Emperor is portrayed
as the epitome of the evil and tyrannical ruler—not least of all because
he burned Confucian books and buried alive Confucian scholars. Mao
Zedong, in the latter years of his own reign (the 1960s and early 1970s),
eagerly embraced the historical analogy, praising the First Emperor and
his Legalist minister Li Si for promoting historical progress in ancient
China, unburdened by the outmoded traditions of the past. Mao also
defended the harshness of the First Emperor’s rule (and implicitly his
own rule) as a model of revolutionary vigilance necessary to suppress
reactionaries and hasten the progressive movement of history.
Mao Zedong’s self-identification with the First Emperor served to
reinforce a strong tendency among Western historians to assume an
essential continuity between China’s long imperial past and its Communist present. The People’s Republic, from this point of view, appears
as yet another dynasty in a long list of Chinese dynasties, with Mao
Zedong an emperor in a long line of Chinese emperors; the Communist bureaucracy as the imperial bureaucracy reincarnated; and Marxism/Mao Zedong Thought, as the official state ideology, functionally
playing a role similar to imperial Confucianism under the old regime.1
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It is no doubt the case that Chinese Communism, if not necessarily the carrier of some traditional Chinese “essence,” is imbued with
at least aspects or fragments of traditional Chinese thought and culture. When Mao Zedong called for the “Sinification of Marxism” in
1938, he suggested more than repackaging Marxism in Chinese wrappings to make it more appealing to Chinese eyes. He also meant making the content of Marxism relevant to Chinese historical conditions
and allowing it to incorporate and inherit all that was valuable in
the Chinese past. To some degree, then, Chinese Marxism was partly
“Chinese.” And it is also probably the case that Mao moved closer to
tradition in his later years, as several scholars have argued.2 In various stages of his intellectual and political life, Mao was attracted to
numerous heroic personalities in traditional Chinese history. Just as
the young Mao took as his hero the mid-19th-century conservative
Confucian statesman Zeng Guofan, and Mao the revolutionary looked
to the heterodox rebel-bandit tradition in Chinese literature, so Mao
the ruler looked to the strong emperors of the past, especially Qin Shihuangdi, the First Emperor, who preceded Mao as one of the two great
unifiers in Chinese history.
Yet these Communist affinities with traditional history and culture,
while real enough, appear in what is an essentially post-traditional age.
To appreciate where Communism stands in the long sweep of Chinese
history, it is necessary to take into account two fundamental breaks
with tradition that took place in the first half of the twentieth century,
one preceding the rise of Chinese Communism, the second coinciding
with the Communist victory of 1949. Both must be kept in mind in considering the place of the People’s Republic in Chinese history.
First, there was a crucial break with the Confucian intellectual tradition, a relatively gradual process of alienation from traditional values that began in the mid-19th century with the Opium Wars and
the growing Western imperialist impingement. It was the beginning
of a rupture with tradition that manifested itself in the emergence
of a modern sense of nationalism in the 1890s (especially after China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95) and then
found expression in a militant political nationalism during the May
Fourth period (circa 1919). It was a nationalism that was paradoxically
accompanied by powerful currents of cultural iconoclasm, a nationalism that tended more to discard traditional culture than celebrate it. In
the 1890s, younger members of the gentry-literati-landlord ruling class
began to lose faith in the utility of old Confucian values. They began to
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question whether traditional beliefs could save China from the growing menace of foreign imperialism and rescue China from what was
increasingly recognized as the country’s terrible backwardness. What
emerged, most importantly, from this process of alienation from traditional values was a new standard of judgment to measure the value
of things both material and spiritual. That new nationalist standard
of measurement was the wealth and power of China as a nation in
a Social Darwinian world of rapacious nation-states. What was now
seen as most important was no longer the preservation of some ancient
Chinese cultural essence (ti), traditionally conceived in terms of Confucian moral principles, but rather the preservation and strength of the
Chinese nation, with or without Confucian morality. The standard of
judgment had changed dramatically.
This new nationalist perspective certainly left open the possibility of using traditional cultural values for modern nationalist ends.
But Chinese nationalism also opened the possibility of abandoning, or
even condemning, the traditional cultural heritage, if old values were
deemed to be incompatible with the search for national “wealth and
power.”3
Modern Chinese nationalism, born at the end of the 19th century,
was amenable to both conservative and radical social ends. It could
be used equally well in the 20th century by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao
Zedong. What Chinese nationalism could not do was to maintain any
real continuity with tradition. It had become a post-traditional Chinese world in which the main value was the preservation and power
of the Chinese nation, not the preservation of traditional culture. The
old culture could be celebrated, but only insofar as the celebration
served modern nationalist ends. The intellectual grounds had shifted
enormously from the time when what was conceived as the traditional
cultural essence (ti) was the dominant value, to which all other values
and beliefs were to be subordinated.
Emerging from a long and painful process of alienation from traditional values, Chinese nationalism was potentially culturally iconoclastic as well as amenable to a nationalist celebration of the cultural
heritage. That iconoclastic potential was realized with a vengeance
during the New Culture Movement of 1915–19, the opening phase of
the broader May Fourth Movement. Now a significant number of Chinese intellectuals began to look at the tradition not only as useless for
the pursuit of modern nationalist ends but morally evil as well, the root
cause of China’s weakness and its plight in the modern world. Lu Xun,
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modern China’s most celebrated writer, characterized Chinese history
as no more than 4,000 years of cannibalism.4 The only remedy was a
complete transformation of the culture, the consciousness, and the
psychology of the Chinese people—in effect, a “cultural revolution”
(wenhua geming), the necessary precondition for meaningful political
and social change.
But whether modern Chinese nationalists celebrated or condemned
the cultural tradition, they did so in a post-traditional intellectual universe where traditional values, while often invoked, were no longer
relevant to thought and action. This, in brief, was the intellectual break
with tradition, and it preceded the Chinese Communist revolution by
nearly half a century. Chinese Communism, it should be emphasized,
was born and developed in this post-traditional intellectual world.
The second break with tradition was the Maoist revolution itself. The
Chinese Communist rupture with the Chinese past was a social break,
not a cultural one. Social revolutions are primarily acts of destruction,
which permit societies to follow new courses. That is precisely what
the Communist victory of 1949 signaled, although the new course in
the end was hardly the one that the victors envisioned. What the Communist Revolution did, most crucially, was to destroy the old scholargentry class, the longest-lasting ruling class in world history, whose
existence as a social class dated to the late feudal period in ancient
China (circa the 5th century B.C.), and whose dominance was secured
by the Qin victory of 221 B.C. and the establishment of the Imperial
regime. Variously known by the names “gentry,” “landlords,” “scholars,” “literati,” and “officials” (or bureaucrats), this was an exceptionally powerful ruling class that collectively performed the essential
economic, political, social, and intellectual functions of traditional Chinese society. The strength and longevity of the “scholar-gentry” class,
unmatched by any other ruling class in world history, was the social
basis for the extraordinary continuity of traditional Chinese civilization over two millennia.
By the early 20th century, however, with the decline and fall of the
Qing (the last of the great Chinese dynasties), under pressure from
the foreign imperialist impingement, the scholar-gentry had largely
degenerated into a parasitic landlord class, still economically, socially,
and politically dominant in local rural areas, but no longer able to
express its interests and authority on a national level. It was the Communist destruction of the remnants of the old gentry-landlord ruling
class—first in the latter stage of the civil war with the Guomindang
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(Nationalist Party) in the late 1940s and then in the nationwide land
reform campaign of 1950–52—that marks the first social revolution in
Chinese history since the Third Century B.C.
It is not the case, of course, that little changed in China over the
2000-year period that, for the sake of convenience, we call “traditional
China;” that is, the long imperial era that began in the 3rd century B.C.
and concluded early in the 20th century with the feeble republican revolution of 1911. The changes were profound over these centuries, and
especially so in science, technology, and economic development—the
very areas in which modern China stagnated and fell so far behind
the advanced Western capitalist countries. Throughout most of human
history, and certainly during what is sometimes called “the medieval
economic revolution” (circa 8th–14th centuries A.D.), China was not
only the most populous but also the most technologically and economically advanced country in the world. And between China’s relatively
advanced material culture and its enormous population, there was an
intimate relationship. The technological transformation of agriculture
during these centuries was the basis for the extraordinary growth of
the Chinese population, which reached nearly 300,000,000 by the 15th
century, an astonishing figure for pre-modern times. A revolution in
money and credit stimulated the emergence of a sophisticated protocapitalist market economy, a vibrant mercantile class, the world’s most
extensive and sophisticated commerce, and urbanization on a scale
known nowhere else in the pre-modern world. These achievements
can be traced back to (and were made possible by) the unification of
China in the Third Century B.C.
The once popular notion of an “unchanging China”—a stereotype,
partly Confucian, partly Hegelian in origin—is, of course, historically
misleading. In such vital areas of human activity as scientific inquiry,
technological innovation, economic development in general, and
urbanization, China’s progress was quite extraordinary over the ages,
especially during the “medieval” era, probably more impressive than
any other pre-modern civilization. Yet developments in material life
did not yield correspondingly innovative changes in traditional social
and political institutions. There were, of course, important sociopolitical changes over the millennia, but they were overshadowed by the
strong continuities with the social and political orders established in
the Third Century B.C. Dynasties rose and fell over the millennia, and
there were long periods of disunity, invasion, and civil war, but the
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essentials of the imperial political system established by the Qin survived, as did its social foundation, the scholar-gentry ruling class.
Eventually, over a period of many centuries, the relative absence of
social and political change began to retard economic and technological development. That point was probably reached in the 14th century,
according to many scholars, more or less coinciding with the establishment of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), although not necessarily
because of the Ming. What is particularly striking to scholars of this
period is the decline and stagnation of technological innovation and
creativity, which over a period of centuries adversely affected economic growth. The reasons for this stagnation are not entirely clear.
One widely discussed theory is known as “the high-level equilibrium
trap,” which holds that China had exploited pre-modern technology
to its economic limits, leaving little room for profitable innovations.
Quantitative expansion was still possible but qualitative changes were
severely limited.5
The notion that late traditional China was caught in a “high-level
equilibrium trap” is perhaps little more than an abstruse way of saying that China failed to develop modern Western-style capitalism and
failed to experience an industrial revolution. The reasons for the failures (perhaps a “West-centric” question to begin with) is an old and
highly controversial matter, most forcefully raised by Max Weber more
than a century ago.6 According to Weber, while capitalism did develop
to a substantial degree in traditional China, it was a process that lacked
the dynamism of its later Western European counterparts. Weber
attributed the latter to the ascetic values highly favorable to capitalist
enterprise that were derived from intellectual tensions inherent in the
beliefs of certain Protestant sects, especially Calvinism. Conversely, as
negative proof, he argued that such ascetic values were absent in traditional Chinese thought, especially Confucianism. To avoid misunderstanding and further oversimplification of a complex and sophisticated
argument, it should be noted that Weber never argued that religiousderived values created Western capitalism but only that modern capitalism once in existence (due to a multitude of social, economic, and
technological factors) acquired its extraordinarily dynamic character
because of ascetic values and a “calculating business mentality” produced by certain religious beliefs. The absence of such beliefs in China,
in turn, explains the comparatively weak development of indigenous
Chinese capitalism.
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While Weber’s argument for “the non-development of capitalism”
in China, or at least its relative weakness compared to Western Europe,
is intellectually interesting and historically suggestive, it is perhaps
more conducive to historical understanding to look to the nature of
the traditional gentry ruling class rather than the nature of Confucian thought. The gentry were an extraordinarily powerful ruling class
that monopolized (sometimes within an individual’s lifetime, usually
within the multigenerational family, and always collectively) the key
economic, political, social, and intellectual functions in traditional Chinese society. The gentry were economically dominant as landlords in
a primarily agrarian society, although they sometimes supplemented
their incomes through commerce, money lending, and the operation of
local industries. They were intellectually dominant as the literati who
had mastered the written Chinese language and were the carriers of
China’s cultural traditions, especially the Confucian ideological tradition, which sanctified their dominant place in the traditional order.
Economic and cultural dominance, in turn, yielded political power;
the bureaucrats who managed the imperial regime were largely drawn
from the gentry class, ideally through the civil service exam system
which required a mastery of classical Confucian literature. The gentry
were socially as well as politically dominant in the rural areas where
85 percent of the Chinese people lived. It was this monopolization of
key social functions—economic, political, and intellectual—by a single
social class that gave the gentry their power and extraordinary longevity as China’s ruling elite for over two millennia.
Reinforcing the longevity and power of the gentry as a conservative ruling class were two rather unique features of traditional Chinese
society. First, the gentry were not a hereditary nobility or a closed caste.
Gentry status was based on a combination (or various combinations) of
wealth and literacy. It was possible, although difficult, for enterprising peasants and merchants, for example, to attain gentry status by
educating a son in the Confucian classics. This would enable him to
pass the civil service examinations in order to become an official and
use wealth derived by bureaucratic means to purchase land and raise
the family to gentry status. A second feature of traditional society was
a well-developed system of private property in land, a system more
or less universalized by the Qin unification in the Third Century B.C.
Most land (although certainly not all land at all times) was alienable;
that is to say, it could usually be freely bought and sold.
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These features of traditional Chinese society—first, a ruling class
whose status was not based on heredity privilege and, second, the
institution of private property in land—were quite unusual attributes
for a pre-modern society. At first glance it would seem these factors
should have favored the development of capitalism. In fact, ironically,
they had profoundly conservative and traditionalist implications. The
alienability of land meant that wealthy urban merchants and protoindustrialists could invest their profits in the relative security of the
agrarian sector and become landlords, rather than invest in the more
risky business of further expanding their commercial enterprises. Land
ownership was not only secure and profitable but was also associated
with great social prestige, that is to say, gentry status. Moreover, since
gentry social standing (which conferred special social and legal privileges as well as moral and social authority) was theoretically based on
merit and not heredity (with merit measured by knowledge of Confucian learning and moral precepts), urban entrepreneurs could aspire
to join the scholar-gentry elite. They would typically do so by educating their brighter sons to enable them to compete in the civil service
exams. Or, in the not infrequent times when corruption was rife, they
could simply buy official degrees and, sometimes, bureaucratic office.
The result of these tendencies was to encourage the traditional Chinese
bourgeoisie to merge into the gentry ruling class and the traditional
social system, rather than to challenge them, as was the general case
in Western Europe. That in turn not only inhibited the development
of capitalism but greatly strengthened the power and longevity of the
gentry ruling class and its Confucian traditions.
The most important social result of the Chinese Communist revolution was the destruction of the traditional gentry ruling class. It was a
class that had been in decline since the late 19th century, but one that
still exercised social, political, and economic dominance in the vast
rural areas of China, typically in the form of parasitic landlordism. The
removal of the gentry was the essential precondition for modern economic progress, and especially industrialization. That process of class
destruction was completed during the Land Reform campaign of 1950–
52, during the course of which substantial numbers of gentry were
killed by angry peasants. But the great majority of the approximately
20,000,000 members of gentry families (about 4 percent of the population) were reduced to ordinary cultivators of the soil, the bulk of their
landholdings redistributed to poorer peasants. It was this destruction
of the gentry as a social class that made the Revolution of 1949 not
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simply a political upheaval but a social revolution, the first in Chinese
history since the Third Century B.C. That, at least, is one answer to the
question of the place of Chinese Communism in Chinese history. It
stands as a fundamental break with a social structure that had existed
for two millennia.
But if the Maoist victory marked a social revolution, what kind of
revolution was it? The usual view is that the Communist victory of
1949 was a socialist revolution, or at least one that moved China in that
direction. I would suggest, on the contrary, that the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) was never socialist in any meaningful sense of that
term; that the social nature of the Maoist revolution, and the historical environment in which it took place, confined post-revolutionary
society to “bourgeois” limits; and that the present era of massive capitalist development is the logical, although perhaps not the necessary,
outcome of the 1949 Revolution. I will try to pursue these interrelated
propositions in the remaining pages of this essay, along with a few
comments on the peculiar nature of Chinese capitalism and its future,
and do so in an attempt to locate the place of Chinese Communism in
Chinese history.
II. The Social Nature of the PRC
The social results of great revolutions rarely correspond to either the
social status of the revolutionaries or their intentions. For example,
one might consider two of the great revolutions of modern history: the
17th-century English Revolution and the French Revolution of 1789.
Both are characterized by many historians as “bourgeois,” or “bourgeois-democratic,” revolutions, that is, both facilitated the development of modern capitalism. Yet in neither revolution did members
of the actual bourgeoisie play significant roles. Few large merchants,
industrialists, and bankers were to be found among the 17th-century
Puritans or among the leaders of the Jacobin Club and the insurgent
mobs of the French Revolution in the late 18th century. The leaders of
the English Revolution were largely members of the rural gentry while
intellectuals, doctors, lawyers, and other professionals were the most
prominent figures in the French Revolution. Cromwell’s army was
mostly composed of dispossessed yeomen while those who stormed
the Bastille were mostly members of the urban poor. In both revolutions, the demands of the revolutionaries were political, social, and
sometimes religious. Neither leaders nor masses sought to build a
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capitalist order; free trade and a market economy were not among
their demands. The Puritans, after all, wished to “purify” the Church,
and the universal slogan of the French Revolution was “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.”
Yet in broader historical perspective, and quite irrespective of the
conscious aims of the revolutionary actors, the most important historical result of both the English and French revolutions was to facilitate
the development of modern capitalism. The revolutions did so by abolishing remaining feudal prerogatives and doing away with restraints
on trade and labor, centralizing everything from weights and measures to the authority of the state, thereby creating a national market,
and freeing the peasants from feudal obligations so that they could
engage in commodity production and capital accumulation or become
urban proletarians. In these and other ways, the English and French
revolutions served the interests of the bourgeoisie and promoted the
development of modern capitalism, and thus became historical models
of a “bourgeois” or “bourgeois-democratic” revolution, although that
certainly was not the intention of the revolutionaries.
In this functional historical sense, the Chinese Communist Revolution can also be characterized as a bourgeois, or capitalist, revolution.
This can be done without the benefit of hindsight that permits us, more
than half a century after the revolutionary victory, to see the massive
process of capitalist development that is sweeping China today as the
outcome of 1949. Even before the “market reforms” undertaken by
Deng Xiaoping and others in 1978 and after, there were good reasons
to describe the Maoist victory as a “bourgeois revolution.” It was, of
course, commonplace in both China and abroad to portray the Communist victory as a “socialist” revolution and Maoist China as a socialist society. But it was socialist only in the most superficial sense. What
the Chinese Communists did was to borrow the Soviet definition of
socialism as a society in which productive property was mostly state
owned or state controlled. By that narrow definition, China was socialist in 1956, when its leaders claimed it to be so. It was socialist in the
sense that by the mid-1950s most urban industrial and commercial
enterprises had been nationalized (either expropriated outright by the
government or bought by the government at low state-determined
prices in return for interest-bearing bonds), with their former owners
often staying on in a managerial capacity. In the countryside, socialism
was the official result of the agricultural collectivization campaign of
1955–56. The state did not legally own collectivized agrarian property
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but effectively controlled it through the organization of production
by the Communist Party. (The distinction between Party and state in
China is, of course, a rather thin one.) In any event, by 1956 productive
private property in both town and countryside had been largely abolished and China was socialist by Stalinist definition.
The Stalinist definition of socialism was woefully inadequate, however. Indeed, it was a gross distortion of the traditional Marxist conception, which taught that socialism was a system by which the immediate
producers (workers and farmers) democratically controlled the conditions and products of their labor. That, of course, was not the system
that prevailed in China, nor was there any meaningful movement in
that direction, either in theory or practice, during the Mao period or
after. China after the mid-1950s might simply be described as a “postrevolutionary society,” neither socialist nor capitalist, or perhaps, if
one prefers, a society occupying a halfway position between capitalism and socialism. More realistically, post-revolutionary China was a
country in which the state functioned as a collective capitalist, exploiting workers and peasants and putting the proceeds of their “surplus
labor” into further investment in the industrial plant. It was a system
of “capitalism without the capitalists,” as Adam Ulam once characterized Communist societies.7
A more fruitful way to look at the historical role of Communism
in China is to understand Maoism as the vehicle of China’s bourgeois
revolution, in effect carrying out the historical tasks that the Revolution of 1911 and the Guomindang sought but failed to achieve in the
early decades of the twentieth century. As a bourgeois (or capitalist)
revolution, the victory of 1949 and the first decade of Maoist rule were
extraordinarily successful. After a long era of political disintegration
and civil war, genuine national unification was achieved. Following
more than a century of foreign impingements and invasions, China
gained true national independence. Independence and national unification, in turn, formed the political basis for the creation of a national
market and for a program of state-sponsored industrialization. About
these measures there is nothing that can be characterized as socialist.
They are typical features of the great bourgeois revolutions that have
yielded modern capitalist economies. Even the Land Reform campaign of 1950–52, the most socially radical measure of the early Maoist regime, fell well within the limits of a bourgeois revolution. Land
Reform destroyed what remained of the pre-capitalist gentry-landlord
class, and thus marked the culmination of a great social revolution. It
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was a capitalist agrarian revolution, however, not a socialist one. The
social result of Land Reform was a petty bourgeois (or petty capitalist)
system of individual family peasant proprietorship with peasants free
to buy, sell, and mortgage land.
In bringing about the reunification of China, in establishing a central
government that actually governed the vast land, in creating a national
market free of foreign impingements, and in creating the conditions
for rapid economic growth and industrialization, the Communists carried out a thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution that earlier 20th-century Chinese regimes had attempted—but failed—to achieve. Land
Reform was a crucial step in this process of “modernization,” for it not
only brought a degree of socioeconomic equity to the rural population but also established a mechanism to channel the agrarian surplus
into financing urban industrialization. Under the Maoist regime, the
peasants were still exploited, but the fruits of that exploitation were
no longer squandered by a parasitic landlord class. Rather, they were
directed by the state to mostly productive activities. The Communist
state, however its leaders conceived and described it, functioned essentially as a collective capitalist.
In the early years of the People’s Republic, Mao Zedong frequently
emphasized the “bourgeois” character and limits of the Communist
Revolution. It was an emphasis that found theoretical expression in the
Maoist theory of “New Democracy,” which envisioned for an indefinite length of time the existence of a significant private capitalist sector
of the economy, albeit one operating under the political auspices of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It was not until the late 1950s that
Mao Zedong, impatient with the sluggish pace of history and seized
by utopian visions of a China that would be both wealthy and communist, totally abandoned the restraints that Marxist teachings placed on
the revolutionary will. The eminently Marxist (and one-time Maoist)
notion that China must proceed through the Marxian-defined “stages
of development,” including a lengthy period of capitalist-type development in the course of which the material conditions for socialism
would be created, was denounced as “revisionist” or worse. Accordingly, Mao embarked on the disastrous adventure of the Great Leap
Forward, whose failures generated the political tensions that culminated in the destructiveness of the Cultural Revolution.
Despite the political and human disasters of Mao Zedong’s late
years, China made remarkable economic and material progress during the quarter-century of Maoist rule. From 1952, when industrial
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production was restored to its highest pre-war levels (i.e., 1936–37), to
the end of the Mao era in 1976, the output of Chinese industry grew
at an average per annum rate of approximately 11 percent. China was
transformed from a primarily agrarian nation to an industrial one in
the sense that industry’s share in the net material product increased
from 23 to over 50 percent, a rate of industrialization that compares
favorably with Britain and Japan during comparable stages of modern
industrial development.8 “In the postwar experience of newly industrializing countries,” Y. Y. Kueh has observed, “probably only Taiwan
has demonstrated as impressive a record as China in this respect.”9 It
is not the case, as sometimes assumed, that the Chinese people did not
benefit from economic growth during the Mao period. Rapid industrialization was accompanied by impressive gains in literacy, education,
and heath care. Most strikingly, and despite the terrible famine that
issued from the Great Leap, life expectancy nearly doubled over the
quarter of a century that Mao ruled China, from an average of 35 years
in the pre-1949 era to 65 years in the mid-1970s.
Yet as the Mao era was drawing to a close in 1976, there was an
abundance of signs that the once great creative energies of Maoism
were exhausted and that the Maoist political and economic system
was moribund. During Mao’s last year, the economy labored under
the weight of a resumption of the factional political struggles left over
from the unresolved battles of the Cultural Revolution. There was an
upsurge in common crime, growing social discontent, popular political disillusionment, and a wave of industrial strikes and factory slowdowns. Agriculture stagnated, and industrial production, which had
been growing at a per annum rate of 10 percent during the Cultural
Revolution decade (1966–75), increased by barely one percent in the
fateful year 1976. Productivity fell in both town and countryside, and
total production was maintained only by expanding the workforce. It
was clear that China needed a new course, but a dying Mao Zedong
and a dogmatized Maoism were incapable of providing fresh initiatives.
In retrospect, it seems that it was almost inevitable, and certainly
historically logical, that post-Mao China would embark on a process of
capitalist development. The Maoist regime itself had unintentionally
contributed to the prospect of a capitalist future, in both negative and
positive ways. The Great Leap, at a terrible human cost, had revealed
the impossibility of further radical social change in the countryside,
where a still technologically primitive agrarian economy operated on
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the bare margins of subsistence even in the best of times. Many peasants still worshipped a deified Mao Zedong but most had lost such
enthusiasm they once had for collectivized farming and longed for
their own plots of land to till.
Nor could China’s growing, but still relatively small, urban working
class provide any sustained impetus for socialism. The proletariat, terrorized into political passivity for the remainder of the revolutionary
era by the GMD counterrevolution of 1927, also remained politically
quiescent during the early years of the People’s Republic, its activities tightly controlled by the CCP and official labor unions. It was
not until the chaotic conditions created by the Cultural Revolution
that workers had the opportunity to organize themselves and act on
their own. While the political effectiveness of the urban working class
was greatly diminished by deep divisions within its ranks—especially
between relatively privileged state workers, who enjoyed the security
of the “iron rice bowl,” and a highly exploited “wandering population” of temporary and contract workers—demands for egalitarianism
and workers’ control of production were soon heard. But the demands
were denounced as “ultra-leftist” by Maoist ideologues well before the
Cultural Revolution had run its bizarre course, and the working class
was again largely condemned to political inaction.
At the same time that the Communist state inhibited political
expression by the class that Marxist theory identified as the agent of
socialism, the Maoist regime was unwittingly constructing the material conditions that would facilitate the rapid development of capitalism, although it did so in the name (and no doubt with the intention)
of building the foundations for socialism. The unification of China,
the establishment of a national market, the building of a centralized
state apparatus and an effective bureaucracy, the construction of a vast
infrastructure of roads, railroads, and electrical systems, and the education of the working population all were measures that could equally
well serve the construction of a capitalist economy as a socialist one.
In the end it was capitalism that was built on Maoist foundations, not
socialism.
The construction of a capitalist order was not the conscious intent
of the “market reformers” who achieved prominence and power in
the post-Mao years. Deng Xiaoping, the most important and powerful of the reformers, had been a Communist all his adult life and
clearly envisioned a socialist future for China, or at least socialism
as he understood it. However, he was not averse to using capitalist
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means to achieve ostensibly socialist ends. The goal was rapid economic development in the most expedient way possible. If political
power remained in the hands of the CCP, Deng and the reformers
assumed that the desired socialist results would more or less automatically follow from “the development of the productive forces,” as the
ubiquitous phase of the time went.
While the reform program originally was to be a hybrid combining
“adjustment by the market” with “adjustment by the plan,” it was soon
discovered that giving the widest latitude to the operation of market
forces was the quickest way to achieve what was called “socialist modernization,” a strategy that found its ideological rationale (particularly
among sympathetic foreign observers) in the dubious notion of “market socialism.” The de-collectivization of agriculture in favor of various
systems of contracting land to individual families soon resulted in a
de-facto system of private property in land. Job security was abolished
for workers in state enterprises, throwing them into a capitalist “free
labor market,” where they were joined by tens of millions of migrant
workers, mostly redundant peasants who had been forced off the now
de-collectivized land. Private sectors in both the urban and rural economies were encouraged, and grew with astonishing rapidity. Foreign
trade and foreign investment were also encouraged, first in “special
economic zones” and then throughout China. With the establishment
of a free labor market, the universalization of the principle of enterprise
profitability, and the decision to rely on market-determined prices, the
Communist state created the essential conditions for a capitalist economy. Within less than a decade the capitalist means of economic development had overwhelmed the socialist ends that they were originally
intended to serve. Indeed, a confusion between means and ends was
present in the thought of the post-Mao reformers from the outset. “The
purpose of socialism,” Deng Xiaoping announced in 1980, “is to make
the country rich and strong.” That certainly was a novel definition of
socialism, but it was well suited to providing a thin layer of ideological
veneer to a program of capitalist modernization. Socialism, whatever
Deng might once have meant by that term, had now been reinterpreted
to mean the long sought nationalist goal of “wealth and power.” In any
event, capitalism, not socialism, was the outcome of the Communist
destruction of the existing social structure.10
This is not the place to seriously discuss the development of capitalism that so rapidly followed from the market reforms undertaken
in the 1980s, perhaps the most massive process of capitalist develop-
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ment in world history. I will only briefly touch upon several closely
interrelated aspects of this outcome: first, the role of the state in the
development of capitalism; second, the phenomenon of “bureaucratic
capitalism” in Chinese history, past and present; and finally, a few brief
comments on the political and cultural consequences of contemporary
Chinese capitalism, particularly as it bears on the question of the place
of Communism in Chinese history.
III. Capitalism and the State
It is one of the great ironies of modern Chinese history that the dynamic
capitalism that has transformed China over the past quarter of a century resulted from decisions that were made by a Communist Party
and implemented by a powerful Communist state. While incongruous
in terms of classical Liberal ideology, in historical fact a crucial role
for the state in the development of capitalism is by no means unusual.
The Bismarckian state, for example, provided much of the impetus
and direction for the development of modern industrial capitalism
in late 19th-century Germany, while state-promoted industrialization
was the dominant force in the history of Meiji Japan (1868–1912). In
the so-called “newly industrializing countries” of the post-World War
II period, state-sponsored capitalist modernization has been universal.
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are among the more successful
examples.
Indeed, it is not only in cases of late modernization (or what Barrington Moore has termed “conservative modernization”) that the
state has been involved in promoting capitalist development. State
power also played an essential role in developing capitalism earlier in
the Western countries, a role that has been obscured by the ideological
need to portray capitalism as the natural expression of some essential
human nature. It is a need that has found expression in the ideology of
the “free market,” which holds that capitalism operates best when it is
free of all external governmental impingements. Yet even in England,
the classic homeland of capitalist development and Liberal ideology, it
was the intervention of the state that created a labor market, which in
turn was a precondition for the development of modern industrial capitalism. The land enclosures, which promoted rural capitalism while
driving millions of peasants off the land to eventually be transformed
into urban proletarians, were not simply the workings of natural economic laws but Acts of Parliament enforced by the courts and police.
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And it was the Poor Law reform of 1834 that finally did away with
traditional rights of subsistence in favor of a “free labor” market, the
functioning of which was enforced by the threat of the workhouse. The
British state was very much involved in creating the necessary conditions for the development of modern industrial capitalism in its very
homeland and its classic incarnation.11
Yet the role of the Communist state in the development of Chinese
capitalism has been qualitatively greater than in any earlier case of
capitalist development. A market economy, after all, presupposes a
bourgeoisie. In all previous cases of state-promoted capitalism there
existed indigenous bourgeois classes whose interests the state could
promote, a bourgeoisie whose numbers could be increased and whose
energies could be harnessed by state authorities to the task of national
economic development. But by the late 1950s, the Chinese bourgeoisie (always a relatively small social class) had all but ceased to exist.
Most of the wealthier members of the bourgeoisie had fled the mainland in 1949. The commercial and industrial enterprises of those who
remained were either expropriated outright or bought out by the Communist state. In the latter case, the former owners were given low-paying (and non-inheritable) government bonds in partial compensation
for the nationalization of their industrial and commercial enterprises.
What remained of the bourgeoisie at the end of the Mao era in 1976
was a small group of aging pensioners collecting modest dividends on
state bonds. Thus an “entrepreneurial class,” in the terminology of the
time, had to be created from scratch if the new market strategy of the
reformers was to be implemented.
It is hardly surprising that this new bourgeoisie was largely recruited
from the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party. Party officials and
cadres had the political influence and the skills to best take advantage
of the pecuniary opportunities that the market offered. Overcoming
such ideological inhibitions as they may have had, many rushed to do
so, either entering business themselves or, more typically, arranging
lucrative positions for their children, relatives, and friends in what
soon became a tangled but highly profitable web of patron-client relationships. Not only did individual Communist officials (and their families) join the new commercial, financial, and industrial bourgeoisie,
but whole bureaucracies entered the marketplace in the guise of capitalist corporations, not excluding the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
which garnered enormous profits by selling arms on the international
market and also by operating a chain of luxury hotels and, through its
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various subsidiaries, some 20,000 industrial, commercial, and financial
enterprises.12
Thus the marriage of the market to a Communist bureaucracy produced not a “socialist market economy,” as was once advertised, but
rather a species of bureaucratic capitalism; that is, a system of political economy in which political power is used for private gain through
capitalist methods of economic activity. The phenomenon in general is
hardly a novelty in world history. But bureaucratic capitalism has been
an unusually prominent feature of Chinese history, both in traditional
and in modern times. Its Chinese origins go back to a former Han
dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 9) when state monopolies were established for
the production and sale of such lucrative commodities as salt, wine,
and iron. Originally operated by Imperial bureaucrats for the purpose
of generating a stable source of state revenue, the monopolies evolved
into a hybrid system whereby private merchants managed production
and distribution under the supervision of high-level bureaucrats. Both
bureaucrats and merchants profited greatly from this symbiotic relationship. But it was the officials who usually had the upper hand. The
officials were relatively secure in their positions, sanctified by tradition
and ideology, whereas the merchants were dependent on bureaucratic
patronage.
The state monopolies were not the only way that bureaucrats
enriched themselves through involvement in capitalist-type activities.
They also profited from a complex system of official leasing and licensing arrangements under which private merchants and craftsmen were
compelled to work; various legal and extra-legal powers of taxation
on commerce and industry; and simple (but usually customarily sanctioned) forms of bribery. Despite the Confucian bias against mercantile
activities, Confucian bureaucrats did not hesitate to profit from market
relationships, directly or indirectly.
One of the social consequences of bureaucratic capitalism in traditional China was that it inhibited the development of the bourgeoisie
as an independent social class, separate from the bureaucracy. The
bureaucrats (“scholar-officials” or “gentry,” simply different terms to
refer to the same social formation) were socially and politically dominant but at the same time they were closely allied with large merchants
and proto-industrialists. In fact, one can speak of the bureaucrats and
the traditional bourgeoisie as interdependent classes. The result, as
the French Sinologist Etienne Balazs has put it, was that “the scholarofficial became ‘bourgeoisified,’ while the merchant’s ambition turned
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to becoming a scholar-official and investing his profits in land.”13 The
tendency of private merchants, industrialists, and bankers to become
absorbed into the bureaucratically dominated economy of imperial
China meant that an independent bourgeoisie never emerged to seriously challenge the traditional Confucian order.
A new chapter in bureaucratic capitalism unfolded in the late 19th
century. During the waning years of the Qing dynasty, which had
been battered by the Western imperialist onslaught since the Opium
Wars of the mid-19th century, an attempt was made at “conservative
modernization” to ward off the threat of foreign colonization. The
modernization effort, known as “the self-strengthening” movement,
was undertaken by the powerful Chinese provincial viceroys of the
Manchu regime rather than by the Manchu dynasty itself, which was
dominated by the obscurantist Empress Dowager. Partially modeled
on the modernization efforts in Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan,
the Chinese effort failed, partly because of the absence of a strong and
effective central government and partly because the foreign imperialist
impingement was already far along in gaining a stranglehold on the
Chinese economy. However, in the course of the failure, the provincial viceroys used their official positions to promote a great variety of
capitalist or quasi-capitalist undertakings from which they amassed
vast private fortunes. The personification of this early phase of modern China’s bureaucratic capitalism was Li Hongzhang (d. 1901), who
occupied the highest political offices in the Empire for three decades,
during which time he also became China’s largest private capitalist,
operating (and profiting from) a steamship transportation company,
arsenals, coal mines, and textile mills, among other enterprises.14
The events immediately preceding and following from the Revolution of 1911 stimulated a reasonably vigorous and more conventional
period of capitalist development (circa 1905–1927), which has been
termed “the golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie.”15 The “golden
age” was brief, however. The consolidation of power by Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist (GMD) regime in 1927 gave rise to what is perhaps
the classic case of bureaucratic capitalism in modern world history.
The two-decade period that the GMD ruled China was marked by the
dominance of the “four big families” (sida): the Kung, Soong, Chen,
and Chiang families. The sida were closely interrelated by politics and
marriage. By virtue of their control of the GMD party-state apparatus,
they dominated—in their capacity as private capitalists—much of the
modern sector of the Chinese economy.
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This system of bureaucratic capitalism ended with the Communist
victory of 1949, when bureaucratic capitalists (or for that matter all capitalists with ties to the Nationalist regime) were expropriated outright
by the new state while so-called “national capitalists” were bought out
by the new regime at low state-determined prices. The bourgeoisie as
a social class ceased to exist in the PRC, although the term “bourgeois”
(or “bourgeoisie”) lived on in official ideology as a condemnation of
heterodox political and ideological behavior.
Yet one of the main conditions that fosters bureaucratic capitalism
survived and indeed was magnified by the Communist political victory of 1949. It is a historical situation in which social classes are generally weak and the state is relatively strong. Such was the condition of
China at the close of the Mao era in 1976, and one of its manifestations
was the absence of a bourgeoisie. Thus, when state leaders in post-Mao
China decided that the creation of a market economy was the most efficient way to promote national economic development, they were also
forced to create a bourgeoisie. This state-fostered bourgeoisie, as we
have seen, was largely recruited from the CCP, and from the relatives
and friends of Party officials.
It would be tempting to attribute the contemporary bureaucratic
capitalist regime to the persistence of old Chinese traditions. After
all, bureaucratic capitalism, in various guises, was a prominent feature of Chinese history from the Han dynasty through the GMD era.
Yet it seems difficult to link bureaucratic capitalism in the post-Mao
era to its earlier incarnations. The Revolution of 1949 constituted a
fundamental break with both the social and political structures of the
past, and it is difficult to identify any meaningful continuities that
connect pre-1949 and post-1979 China. Moreover, bureaucratic capitalism in contemporary China has been associated with extremely high
rates of national economic growth, which has made China the world’s
second largest economy (as measured by purchasing power parity).
This stands in striking contrast to bureaucratic capitalism in traditional and early modern China, which often, especially in the 19th and
early 20th centuries, was associated with general economic stagnation
(although the bureaucratic capitalists prospered). This suggests that
factors other than the origins and nature of the bourgeoisie are crucial
for determining the rate of economic growth. In the case of China, the
contrast between the stagnant bureaucratic capitalism of the Guomindang period and the dynamic bureaucratic capitalism of the post-Mao
PRC can be better explained by such factors as the 1950–52 land reform
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campaign (and the consequent ability to channel the agrarian surplus
into industrial development), a far more unified nation-state with a
relatively well-developed infrastructure, and a much more favorable
position in the global capitalist economy by an independent and strong
Chinese nation-state.
The relationship between bureaucratic capitalism and economic
growth has varied enormously from country to country, and indeed
within the same country, as has been the case in China in different
historical eras. It is not a matter that lends itself to easy conclusions
or broad generalizations. On the other hand, the political and cultural
implications of contemporary Chinese capitalism seem fairly clear. A
few words might be ventured about these topics by way of conclusion.
IV. Capitalism and Political Democracy
The association of capitalism with political democracy, and the belief
that a capitalist economy naturally produces a democratic political
system, largely derive from the experience of countries where modern
capitalism developed early, especially England, France, and the United
States. Yet even in economically advanced countries, the construction of
a democratic political regime has been a lengthy and tortuous process.
For example, in France, the homeland of the classic bourgeois-democratic (or capitalist) revolution, it was not until the Third Republic in
1871, nearly a century after the great Revolution of 1789, that a viable
political democracy was established. Monarchical restorations, dictatorships, and failed revolutions filled the intervening years.
In countries where industrial capitalism developed relatively late,
the modernization process typically has taken place under the guidance of a relatively autonomous and authoritarian state, whose social
basis is an alliance between a landed aristocracy that has turned to
commercial pursuits and a modern bourgeoisie that is still too weak
to rule on its own. Consequently, democratic institutions and traditions are weak and the state is strong. Indeed, in both Bismarckian
Germany and Meiji Japan, the two most notable cases of late capitalist
modernization, the eventual political outcome was fascism. In these
and many other cases in which fascist or highly authoritarian political regimes resulted, the nascent bourgeoisie, as Moore has phrased
it, exchanged “the right to rule for the right to make money.”16 The
authoritarian state, for its part, attempts to create conditions favorable to the development of urban and rural capitalism, supporting,
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for example, repressive labor policies that aim to extract an ever larger
surplus from the working population, especially in the rural areas. But
the conscious aim of state leaders is not so much to promote capitalism
as to pursue the eminently nationalist goals of building industrial and
military power in order to catch up with the more advanced capitalist
countries.
It seems to me that China, in the post-Mao era, has been pursuing a
variant of this “conservative route to modernization.” A powerful and
autonomous state apparatus is one of the legacies of the Mao period
that has been preserved by the post-Mao market reformers. That state
has been employed by Mao’s successors to sweep away all social and
ideological barriers to rapid capitalist development, especially “socialistic” institutions constructed during the Mao period. In the countryside, collectivistic and cooperative work units (along with much of the
rural health and welfare systems) have been dismantled in order to
create a commercialized rural economy. In the cities, the so-called “iron
rice bowl” of job security and welfare benefits enjoyed by about half of
the urban working class during the Mao years has been broken in the
name of “reform.” In both town and countryside these market reforms
have facilitated a more intensive exploitation of the working population, the real secret of the Chinese economic miracle. Both the state
and the state-created bourgeoisie have benefited from this process of
intensive exploitation. And as in virtually all cases of “modernization,”
it is the peasants who are the principal victims of economic progress.
In China, the most visible manifestation of the price of modernization is the growing “floating population” (youmin) of migrant laborers.
Several hundred million redundant peasants have been forced off the
land and wander around the country to find temporary work, often at
construction sites; they have little choice but to labor for pitiful wages
and endure miserable conditions of life.
To greater or lesser degrees, these are common features of capitalist
development in general and late “conservative modernization” in particular. What is unique in the case of China is that the social basis of the
modernizing state—a bourgeoisie and commercialized rural class—
had to be created by the state itself. It was the Communist state that
undertook the task of breeding both an urban and a rural bourgeoisie,
largely from within its own ranks. In this sense, the Chinese model of
conservative modernization is even more statist and bureaucratic in
character than were its German and Japanese predecessors. And the
prospects for a democratic political evolution are even less promising.
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It seems most unlikely that a bourgeoisie that is so dependent on the
Communist state, indeed in many respects still psychologically and
materially tied to the Party-state apparatus, will promote a movement
to limit the power of a state from which it benefits so greatly.
V. Capitalism and the Chinese Tradition
Bureaucratic capitalism in contemporary China is still capitalism in its
essential workings, however peculiar its origins. Like all processes of
capitalist development, the Chinese version is profoundly subversive
of tradition. No force in history has dissolved sacred beliefs and venerated cultural practices as rapidly and profoundly as capitalist forces
of production. Karl Marx, more than a century-and-a-half ago, in celebrating the astonishing productive powers of capitalism, perhaps best
described its cultural implications:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society… . Constant revolutionizing of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all
earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient
and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned.17

In this passage, and even more so in the longer passage of which this
quotation is a part, Marx captures the dynamic and frenetic character
of capitalism in a way that is no less relevant to our day than it was to
his. He both celebrates and laments the dissolution of ancient beliefs
and sanctified traditions under the relentless pressure of capitalist
development. He anticipates the world of perpetual flux, upheaval,
and fragmentation that today is described by such terms as “modernism,” “modernization theory,” and “globalization.”
No country has experienced a more massive and more rapid process of capitalist development than has China over the past quarter
of a century. Just as capitalism is sweeping the vast land, so what
remains of traditional beliefs and structures are disintegrating with
equal rapidity. The Confucian tradition has been eroding for a long
time, ever since the lengthy and painful transition from “culturalism
to nationalism” in the late 19th century and the virulent cultural icono25
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clasm of the May Fourth era. These were followed by the Maoist revolution of 1949, which destroyed the scholar-gentry class that had for so
long been the social carrier of traditional values and culture. Yet at no
time has there been so rapid and so radical a rupture with traditional
culture as the one we are witnessing today, as China submits to, and
indeed embraces, the relentless and coldly universal imperatives of
the world capitalist market. The remnants of tradition are drowning in
what Marx called capitalism’s “icy waters of egotistical calculation.”18
The traditions linger on only in the form of commodities, as objects on
display in the silence of museums, and as grotesque exhibits in Disneyland-like theme parks, where they can be viewed by foreign and Chinese tourists for the price of an admission ticket. Thus, China shares
with other modern nations that most non-Confucian feeling—the loss
of any real sense of tradition.
It is one of the great ironies of Chinese history that Communism has
been the historical agent to usher in modern capitalism. And capitalism, in turn, has concluded in the century-long iconoclastic assault on
the Confucian tradition, uprooting and dissolving the vestiges of traditional culture. Even as the Communist regime substitutes a nationalist
celebration of the millennial Chinese tradition (in the form of “Confucian institutes,” for example) in place of its once revolutionary ideology, that tradition is melting away under the torrid development of
the capitalist forces of production that Communist leaders have been
promoting since 1978. 
•
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